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Abstract Lowpower fault tolerance design techniques trade
reliability to reduce the area cost and the power overhead of
integrated circuits by protecting only a subset of their work-
load or their most vulnerable parts. However, in the presence
of faults not all workloads are equally susceptible to errors.
In this paper, we present a low power fault tolerance design
technique that selects and protects the most susceptible
workload. We propose to rank the workload susceptibility
as the likelihood of any error to bypass the logic masking
of the circuit and propagate to its outputs. The susceptible
workload is protected by a partial Triple Modular Redun-
dancy (TMR) scheme. We evaluate the proposed technique
on timing-independent and timing-dependent errors induced
by permanent and transient faults. In comparison with
unranked selective fault tolerance approach, we demon-
strate a) a similar error coverage with a 39.7% average
reduction of the area overhead or b) a 86.9% average error
coverage improvement for a similar area overhead. For
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the same area overhead case, we observe an error cover-
age improvement of 53.1% and 53.5% against permanent
stuck-at and transition faults, respectively, and an average
error coverage improvement of 151.8% and 89.0% against
timing-dependent and timing-independent transient faults,
respectively. Compared to TMR, the proposed technique
achieves an area and power overhead reduction of 145.8%
to 182.0%.
Keywords Selective fault tolerance · Workload
susceptibility analysis · Susceptible workload · Output
deviations · Permanent faults · Transient Faults
1 Introduction
Reliability of devices has been affected by technology scal-
ing despite its advantages. Devices manufactured using 32
nm technologies and below are more prone to errors pro-
duced by all sources of instability and noise [19, 20] due
to the elevated cost of mitigating process variability [6] and
the escalation of aging mechanisms [16]. As a result, tran-
sient and permanent faults can appear in general logic and
generate errors in-the-field. Therefore techniques to make
Integrated Circuits (ICs) fault tolerant are required. Fault
tolerant IC design techniques are utilized for enhancing cir-
cuit reliability. These techniques often rely on redundancy
of information, time or hardware [7]. Particularly, hardware
redundancy consists of the complete or partial replication of
a circuit in order to ensure correct functionality. By repli-
cating the circuit, the reliability is increased as it is highly
unlikely that an error would occur on every replica at the
same time. Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) utilizes two
replicas of the original circuit, whose outputs are passed
on to a majority voter [7]. TMR has been widely used
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for safety-critical applications where robustness and data
integrity are the top priority. Although TMR achieves a high
level of reliability, it imposes a high area and power over-
head, 200% of the original circuit plus the voter circuits,
thus it is not viable for low power applications. Selective
Fault Tolerance (SFT) and Selective hardening have been
proposed to reduce area overhead and power consumption,
by protecting only a subset of the workload of a circuit or
its most vulnerable parts [3, 27].
Selective hardening aims to protect the most vulnera-
ble parts of a circuit against soft errors [27]. This has
been achieved in microprocessors [13, 14] through the iden-
tification of the architectural vulnerability factor of state
elements which often requires stuck-at fault injection cam-
paigns to calculate. Moreover, selective hardening has also
been used in combinational logic to identify and protect
vulnerable gates or nodes. This is achieved by propagating
signal probabilities at the RT-Level to estimate the like-
lihood of an erroneous output caused by soft errors [8,
15, 17, 27]. A recent selective hardening technique uses
a lightweight algorithm to rank the soft error susceptibil-
ity of logic cones in combinational logic according to their
size, which is given by the sum of the fan-in and fan-out of
its cells [23]. The highest ranked cones are duplicated and
compared to detect if an error has occurred, in which case,
shadow latches at the input enable a roll-back mechanism to
recover from the error.
On the other hand, SFT as introduced by [3, 4], ensures
functional protection of a pre-defined set of input pat-
terns, which are referred to as workload, by using a partial
TMR scheme. However, in the presence of a fault, not
all input patterns are equally susceptible to it. Some pat-
terns are less protected by the inherent logic masking of
a circuit. When such patterns are executed in the presence
of faults, the probability that the logic masking will be
bypassed and an erroneous response will be generated is
higher. Such patterns are defined as the susceptible work-
load. Previous works on SFT rely on randomly selecting the
workload to protect without examining the susceptibility of
that workload to faults.
Probabilistic fault models were developed for ranking
test patterns according to their ability to sensitize the logic
cones of a circuit that are more likely to propagate an erro-
neous response. Probabilistic fault models are known for
improving both the modeled and the unmodeled defect
coverage of tests, while not being biased towards any partic-
ular type of faults. Output deviations (OD) were introduced
in [26] as an RT-Level fault model calibrated through
technology failure information that stems from technology
reliability characterization, such as inductive fault analysis
[9]. This model is utilized for selecting the input patterns
that maximize the probability of propagating an erroneous
response to the primary outputs. The input patterns with the
highest output deviations have a greater ability to bypass
the inherent logic masking of the circuit. In [25] is shown
that selecting input patterns with high output deviations
tends to provide more effective error detection capabilities
than traditional fault models. In [24], a test set enrich-
ment technique for the selection of test patterns is proposed.
Output deviations have also been used for enriching the
unmodeled defect coverage of tests during x-filling [5] and
linear [11, 12, 21] and statistical [22] compression. The out-
put deviation-based metric proposed in [12], was shown to
increase the unmodeled defect coverage of test vectors by
considering both timing-independent defects, such as stuck-
at faults, and timing-dependent defects, such as transition
faults which require two patterns.
In this paper, we present a novel low power fault tol-
erance design technique applicable at the register-transfer-
level, that selects and protects the most susceptible work-
load on the most susceptible logic cones by targeting both
timing-independent and timing-dependent errors. Prelimi-
nary results of this technique were presented in [10], where
only the timing-independent errors induced by stuck-at
faults and input bit-flips were considered. The workload
susceptibility is ranked as the likelihood of any error to
bypass the inherent logic masking of the circuit and prop-
agate an erroneous response to its outputs when that work-
load is executed. The susceptible workload is protected by
a partial Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) scheme. To
evaluate the fault-tolerance ability of the proposed tech-
nique, we consider as surrogate error models the timing-
independent errors induced by stuck-at faults and transient
input bit-flips. We also consider the timing-dependent errors
induced by transition faults and temporary erroneous out-
put transitions. We demonstrate that the proposed technique
can achieve a similar error coverage with an average 39.7%
area/power cost reduction. Furthermore, it can improve by
86.9% on average the achieved error coverage with a sim-
ilar area/power cost. Particularly, when protecting only the
32 most susceptible patterns, an average error coverage
improvement of 53.1% and 53.5% against errors induced
by stuck-at and transition faults is achieved, respectively,
compared to the case where the same number of patterns
are protected without any ranking. Additionally, we observe
an average error coverage improvement of 151.8% and
89.0% against temporary erroneous output transitions and
errors induced by bit-flips, respectively. These error cov-
erage improvements incur in an area/power cost in the
range of 18.0-54.2%, which corresponds to a 145.8-182.0%
reduction compared to TMR.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an
overview of previous works on Selective Fault Tolerance,
reviews the probabilistic fault model of output deviations,
introduces the concepts of uncorrelated and application-
specific workloads and presents a motivational example.
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Section 3 describes the proposed probabilistic selective fault
tolerance design technique and output deviation-based rank-
ing metrics used for pattern ranking. Simulation results
from the application of the proposed technique to a set of
the LGSynth’91 and ISCAS’85 benchmarks are discussed
in Section 4. Finally, the concluding remarks are given in
Section 5.
2 Motivation
In this section, the concept of Selective Fault Tolerance and
the probabilistic fault model of output deviations (OD) are
reviewed and the different types of workloads considered
in this paper are briefly introduced. The capabilities of the
OD model of detecting errors induced by multiple types of
faults compared to the random selection of input patterns is
presented as a motivational example.
2.1 Selective Fault Tolerance
Selective Fault Tolerance (SFT) was proposed as a modifi-
cation of TMR. SFT reduces TMR cost by protecting the
functionality of the circuit for only a subset of input patterns
[3]. This input pattern subset X1 is selected randomly by the
designer. The input patterns within the subset are ensured
to be protected with the same level of reliability of TMR,
while the rest are not guaranteed protection.
Figure 1 depicts the existing technique of SFT design.
For a circuit S1 to be protected using SFT, two smaller cir-
cuits s2 and s3 are generated. The behaviour of circuits s2
and s3 with a protected set X1 is described as follows:
S1(x) = s2(x) = s3(x), x ∈ X1 (1)
(S1(x) = s2(x)) ∨ (S1(x) = s3(x)), x /∈ X1 (2)
According to the heuristic presented in [4], in order to
determine if the input x falls within the protected set X1, the
characteristic function χ(x) must be specified. The output
of this function is passed on to a modified majority voter as
shown in Fig. 1, where the outputs of s2 and s3 are consid-
ered if and only if χ(x) = 1, otherwise the output of the
protected design is the output of circuit S1.
χ(x) =
{
1 x ∈ X1 =⇒ S = Vout
0 x /∈ X1 =⇒ S = S1 (3)
A simplified method for SFT was proposed in [2], where
the circuits s2 and s3 are replaced by identical circuits. These
circuits are the minimal combinational circuits that for an
input pattern within the protected set X1, exhibit the same
output as the original circuit S1. The protected design can
be described in the following form: (don′t care indicates
undefined values).
S1(x) = s2(x) = s3(x), x ∈ X1 (4)
(s2(x) = don′t care) ∧ (s3(x) = don′t care), x /∈ X1 (5)
2.2 Probabilistic Fault Model: Output Deviations
The selection of input patterns with high output deviations
tends to provide higher error detection capabilities than tra-
ditional fault models [25]. Output Deviations are used to
rank patterns according to their likelihood of propagating a
logic error. There are a few requirements to compute the out-
put deviations of an input pattern. First, a confidence level
vector is assigned to each gate in the circuit. The confidence
level Rk of a gate Gk with N inputs and one output is a
vector with 2N elements such as:
Rk = (r00...00k , r00...01k , r00...10k , r00...11k , · · · , r11...11k ) (6)
where each rxx...xxk denotes the probability that Gk’s out-
put is correct for the corresponding input pattern. The
actual probability values of the confidence level vectors
can be generated from various sources, e.g., inductive fault
Fig. 1 Previous Selective Fault
Tolerance design
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analysis, layout information or transistor-level failure prob-
abilities. In this paper, the probability values obtained by
inductive fault analysis shown in [9] are used. However, as
it is discussed in [26], deviation-based test patterns may be
generated using various sets of confidence level vectors.
Propagation of signal probabilities in the circuit follows
the principle shown in [18], with no consideration for signal
correlation to reduce computation complexity. The signal
probabilities pk,0 and pk,1 are associated to each net k in
the circuit. In the case of the NOR gate G2 with inputs c, d
and output f , the propagation of signal probabilities with
the confidence level vector r is as follows:
pz,0 = pc,0pd,0
(
1 − r00k
)
+ pc,0pd,1r01k
+pc,1pd,0r10k + pc,1pd,1r11k (7)
pz,1 = pc,0pd,0r00k + pc,0pd,1
(
1 − r01k
)
+pc,1pd,0
(
1 − r10k
)
+ pc,1pd,1
(
1 − r11k
)
(8)
Example: considering r = (0.8, 0.9, 0.9, 0.9)), if input
c=0 and d=0 (pc,0pd,0=1), then pz,0=0.2 and pz,1=0.8. Sim-
ilarly, for c=1 and d=1 (pc,1pd,1=1), the propagated signal
probabilities result in pz,0=0.9 and pz,1=0.1.
The same principle is applied to compute the signal prob-
abilities for all gate types. For a gate G, let its fault-free
output value for the input pattern tj be d, d ∈ (0, 1). The
output deviation Gj of G for input pattern tj is defined as
pGd¯ , where d¯ is the complement of d (d¯ = 1 − d). In other
words, the output deviation of an input pattern is a measure,
unbiased towards any fault model, of the likelihood that the
output is incorrect due to a fault in the circuit [26].
Example Figure 2 shows a circuit with a confidence level
vector associated with each gate. The table presents three
input patterns and their output deviations. The first column
shows the input pattern (a, b, c, d), along with the expected
fault-free output value z. The next columns show the signal
probabilities for both logic ’0’ and ’1’ of the two internal
nets and the primary output (e, f, z). The output devia-
tion of a pattern is the likelihood that an incorrect value is
observed at the output z. Therefore the output deviations
(the erroneous behaviour in G3) for the presented input pat-
terns are: 3,0000 = pz,1, 3,0101 = pz,1, 3,1111 =
pz,0. In this example, the input pattern 1111 has the great-
est output deviation, with a probability of observing a 0
(the erroneous value) at z of pz,0=0.396, thus offering the
highest likelihood of detecting an error. •
2.3 Workload Types
In the context of this paper, we consider two workload types
based on whether the application is known during design:
– Uncorrelated workload: We consider that the applica-
tion of the IC is not known during the design time,
such as general purpose processors, and, hence, the
in-the-field workload can only be considered uncorre-
lated. Only protection against the timing-independent
errors, such as those induced by stuck-at faults or input
bit-flips, can be targeted.
– Application-specific workload: The application of the
IC is known during the design time, hence some infor-
mation related to the in-the-field workload might also
be available. Therefore, the workload can be protected
against both timing-independent and timing-dependent
errors, because the input patterns of the IC might be
correlated allowing the identification of consecutive
susceptible patterns within the workload.
2.4 Motivational Example
Table 1 presents the results of a motivational example that
shows how different patterns in a workload may exhibit dif-
ferent susceptibility to errors. We select two sets of patterns.
The first set is random patterns (rp) and the second set is
selected based on the probabilistic fault model of output
deviations (pp) [26] for the combinational circuit pdc from
the LGSynth’91 benchmarks. For this experiment, we gen-
erate rp and pp sets by gradually increasing the size of the
sets from 8 to 1024 patterns. The values of the random pat-
terns presented (rp columns), are obtained using the average
results of 30 different sets. The first column shows the size
of the rp and pp sets. The next columns show the fault cov-
erage of the rp and the pp, respectively, obtained by fault
simulating the circuit against the permanent fault models of
stuck-at (SA) and transition faults. These results represent
he ratio of faults which affect the operation of the circuit
for the examined input patterns. The pp set used to compute
Fig. 2 Output deviations
example [26]: (a) simple circuit
with confidence level vectors
and (b) propagated output
deviations
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Table 1 Measured SA fault coverage, transition fault coverage, susceptibility to bit-flips and temporary erroneous output transition between
probabilistic and random patterns, for circuit pdc
patterns SA fault coverage (%) Impr. (%) Tran. fault coverage (%) Impr. (%) Bit-flips suscept. (%) Impr. (%) EOT suscept. (%) Impr. (%)
rp pp rp pp rp pp rp pp
8 4.9 14.2 189.4 1.7 7 300.0 0.6 1.9 216.0 0.3 1.0 287.5
16 5.3 19.6 268.6 3.4 11.5 240.4 1.6 3.3 106.3 0.5 2.0 293.8
32 6.5 26.6 311.1 6.3 19.0 202.2 2.6 4.8 84.7 1.4 3.6 161.6
64 9.7 33.7 247.9 10.5 24.6 133.9 5.1 9.4 84.3 2.4 6.9 195.3
128 21.6 42.1 94.7 12.4 32.6 163.2 10.1 16.3 61.4 4.7 14.0 195.0
256 22.4 49.8 122.1 18.5 41.0 121.5 20.8 29.6 42.3 12.3 28.1 127.4
512 37.0 56.2 51.9 24.8 49.0 97.9 45.3 57.3 26.5 23.1 49.7 114.8
1024 39.0 61.8 58.5 33.9 57.3 69.1 83.3 93.5 12.0 53.0 82.2 55.2
the stuck-at fault coverage was obtained by considering
an uncorrelated workload, while the pp set used to com-
pute the transition fault coverage was obtained considering
an application-specific workload consisting of 20000 pat-
terns. Columns ‘Impr.’ show the improvement of the pp
over the rp. The pp set presents a higher susceptibility than
the rp set for stuck-at faults, which is in the range [51.9%,
311.1%], and for transition faults in the range of [69.1%,
300%]. This is due to the pp set containing the patterns
with the highest output deviations which, by definition, have
the highest likelihood to propagate an error to the output
[26]. The next columns present results from the suscepti-
bility evaluation of the rp and pp sets of patterns against
errors induced by input bit-flips and temporary erroneous
output transitions. The pp set used to evaluate the error
coverage induced by bit-flips was obtained considering an
uncorrelated workload, while the pp set used to compute
the temporary erroneous output transitions was obtained
by considering an application-specific workload. Particu-
larly, input bit-flips are conducted by flipping a single bit at
every input pattern of an uncorrelated workload. The values
shown are the percentage of bit-flips at the primary inputs
that bypassed the logic masking and propagated through the
circuit to reach the output. For such errors, the pp set exhibit
higher susceptibility [12.0%, 216.0%] compared to the rp
set. In the case of temporary erroneous output transitions,
which are errors that manifest as sporadic missing transi-
tions at the outputs when applying consecutive pattern pairs
within an application-specific workload, we observe that the
pp set exhibits an error coverage improvement in the range
of [55.2%, 293.8%], compared to the rp set.
3 Proposed Probabilistic Selective Fault Tolerance
(PSFT) Design Technique
This section describes the proposed Probabilistic Selective
Fault Tolerance (PSFT) design technique.
3.1 PSFT Design
The Probabilistic Selective Fault Tolerance (PSFT) design
is presented in Fig. 3. The PSFT design consists of a partial
TMR scheme of the original circuit S, two smaller redun-
dant circuits SP , and a ZP characteristic function. The latter
validates when the inputs of the SP units belong to the pro-
tected input pattern set. Different from the previous SFT
design, shown in Fig. 1, the original circuit S is connected
to all the inputs nodes, while the SP and ZP units are only
connected to the input nodes of the logic cones selected for
protection (Ip < I , Op < O). A majority voter VP is used
at the outputs of the circuit which operates only when the
output is asserted (Z = 1). If Z = 0, then the voter propa-
gates the outputs of the original circuit S. This functionality
is described in Eqs. 9 and 10.
Sp1(x) = Sp2(x) = S(x) x ∈ Zp (9)
Sp(x) = don′t care x /∈ Zp (10)
3.2 Proposed PSFT Design Flow
Figure 4 presents the flow diagram for the proposed PSFT
design technique. The number of patterns to protect (N)
and the percentage of cones to protect Cp are considered as
parameters of the proposed technique. The proposed tech-
nique consists of two processes. First, the logic cone selec-
tion, determines which logic cones of the circuit to protect
given the Cp parameter, and produces the Selected Cones
list Sc. The next process is the pattern ranking and selection,
which consists of two different sub-processes depending
on the workload type (uncorrelated or application-specific).
For uncorrelated workload, a timing-independent ranking
is performed on a large number of patterns and the N
patterns who exhibit the highest output deviation metric
are selected. For application-specific workload, a timing-
dependent ranking of consecutive pattern pairs is deployed
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Fig. 3 Proposed Probabilistic
Selective Fault Tolerance design
to select the N/2 consecutive pairs that maximize the out-
put deviation metric. Finally, the list of protected patterns is
ready and may be synthesized.
3.3 Process 1 : Logic Cone Selection
The Cp (cone percentage) parameter defines the percent-
age of the cones to be protected. This parameter allows that
the largest cones, in which errors are most likely to occur,
are prioritized for protection, similarly to the cone selection
technique presented in [23]. Initially, the cones are weighted
according to their exclusive size |Ces |. The exclusive size
Fig. 4 Proposed design technique flow diagram.
of a cone |Ces | is the number of cells included in that cone
that are not contained in any previously selected cone. The
process begins by setting the percentage of selected cones
Csp to 1/(# cones). The cone with the highest exclusive
size |Ces | is picked for protection by including it in the
selected cones list SC . The percentage of selected cones
Ps is increased by 1/(# cones) and the exclusive sizes of
the each cone are updated. The process repeats until Ps is
higher or equal to the target Cp value. Finally, the selected
cones list Sc is passed on to the pattern ranking and selection
process.
Example The logic cone selection process for a small cir-
cuit is shown in Fig. 5. The three logic cones of the circuit
have been marked and ranked according to their exclusive
size |Ces |. The cone Z1 has a |Ces | of 8 cells, the cone Z2
of 4 and the cone Z3 of 1 cell. Note that the Z2 cone has an
actual size of 7 cells and an exclusive size of 4, because it
shares 3 cells with cone Z1 that have been discarded when
calculating their exclusive sizes. The Cp parameter allows
a trade-off between area overhead and error coverage. Par-
ticularly for this example, when Cp = 0.3, the Z1 cone
will be selected. When Cp = 0.6, both Z1 and Z2 cones
are selected. Finally, with a Cp = 1.0, all three cones are
selected. This trade-off is explored in Section 4. •
3.4 Process 2 : Pattern Ranking and Pattern Selection
First, all cones in the selected cones list Sc are assigned an
initial weight W(c) = 1. The weights are used by the pat-
tern ranking process to ensure that the selected patterns to
protect are not all biased towards a particular cone in the Sc.
Next, according to the workload type, either uncorrelated or
application specific, different pattern ranking processes are
performed.
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Fig. 5 Example of logic cone selection with different Cp
3.4.1 Timing-independent Pattern Ranking for Uncorrelated
Workload
For an uncorrelated workload, where all input patterns
are considered equally likely to occur without a known
sequence, a ranking of a large number of patterns for protec-
tion of timing-independent faults is performed. We define
Timing-Independent Deviation T ID(p, c) as the output
deviation-based metric for ranking input patterns where no
sequence of patterns is known.
Let T ID(p, c) be the deviation computed of pattern p
for cone c ∈ Sc. Then the selected probabilistic pattern Pp
is given by:
max(W(c)·T ID(p, c)) = W(c)·T ID(p, c) =⇒ Pp = p
(11)
The selected probabilistic pattern Pp shown in Eq. 11
is the one in which the multiplication of the T ID(p, c)
with the cone weights W(c), is the maximum after the
T ID(p, c) of a large number of patterns are computed.
The weight of the selected cone cs in which the maximum
T ID(p, c) was observed, is updated according to:
W(cs) = W(cs) · P (12)
In order to avoid selecting patterns that target the same
largest cones, the weight of the cones that have been already
targeted by the selected probabilistic patterns are updated
using Eq. 12 after each cone selection. The real-valued
parameter P may be set to any value within [0, 1], however,
using small values would significantly reduce the weight of
the selected cone, preventing such cone from being selected
in the next iteration even if the T ID of a pattern for that
cone is high. In order to prevent such scenario, we used
P = 0.9 for our experiments allowing for cones where the
T ID is consistently high to be selected in adjacent itera-
tions. The whole ranking process is repeated until all the
required N probabilistic patterns have been selected.
Example Table 2 presents an example of a pattern selection
using the T ID metric. Consider the logic cones of Fig. 5
with weights W(z3) = 1, W(z2) = 0.9 and W(z1) = 0.81,
and two input patterns pa and pb. Applying the ranking
based on the T ID metric results in a selection of the pat-
tern pb. This is due to W(z2) · T ID(pb, z2) resulting in the
highest value (0.63). After this selection, the weight of the
cone z2 is reduced according to Eq. 12.
3.4.2 Timing-dependent Pattern Ranking
for Application-specific Workload
In the case of an application-specific workload, where
a sequence of patterns of size r is expected, a pattern
ranking for timing-dependent faults is deployed. Timing-
Dependent Deviation T DD([pk, pk+1], c) is the output
deviation based-metric for ranking consecutive input pat-
terns pairs in a known pattern sequence.
Let T DD([pk, pk+1], c) be the deviation computed of
consecutive pattern pairs [pk, pk+1] for cone c ∈ Sc where
k = (0, 1, 2, ...r) and r is the size of the application-specific
workload. The selected probabilistic pattern pair [Pp, Pp+1]
is calculated as follows:
max(W(c) · T DD([pk, pk+1], c)) = W(c) · T ID(p, c)
=⇒ [Pp, Pp+1] = [pk, pk+1]
(13)
The consecutive pattern pair [Pp, Pp+1] shown in
Eq. 13 is the one in which the multiplication of the
T DD([pk, pk+1], c) with the cone weights W(c), is the
maximum of all possible consecutive pattern pairs in
the application-specific workload. Similarly to the timing-
independent ranking, the weight of the cone cs in which the
Table 2 T ID pattern ranking and selection example
Cone Weight W(c) Pattern T ID(p, c) W(c) · T ID(p, c)
z3 1.00 pa 0.25 0.25
pb 0.40 0.40
z2 0.90 pa 0.55 0.495
pb 0.70 0.63
z1 0.81 pa 0.75 0.607
pb 0.70 0.567
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Table 3 Benchmark circuit Inputs/Outputs and Gates
Benchmark I/O Gates Benchmark I/O Gates
pdc 16/40 806 ex5 8/63 256
table3 14/14 445 t481 16/1 389
z9sym 9/1 291 c880 60/26 383
c3540 50/22 1699 c5315 178/123 2307
c6288 32/32 2406 c7552 207/108 3512
maximum T DD([pk, pk+1], c) was observed, is reduced
according to Eq. 12. This process is repeated until N/2
consecutive pattern pairs have been selected.
4 Experimental Validation
This section evaluates the proposed selective fault tolerance
design technique by applying it on a subset of combinational
circuits from the LGSynth’91 and ISCAS’85 benchmark
suites (Table 3). The simulation setup for this evaluation
is detailed. Comparison results against randomly protecting
workload are presented with a discussion on the area cost of
the proposed technique and a trade-off analysis for various
number of patterns (N ) and cone percentages (Cp). Finally,
a comparison of computational effort between the proposed
technique and statistical fault injection is performed.
4.1 Evaluation Setup
First, the most susceptible patterns and pattern pairs are syn-
thesized using the ABC synthesis tool [1] into the proposed
partial TMR scheme (Fig. 3) used by the PSFT technique.
Figure 6 depicts the simulation setup used for the evalua-
tion of the error coverage (EC) achieved by the proposed
technique against errors induced by permanent and transient
faults. For the permanent faults evaluation, single stuck-
at (SSA) faults and transition faults are injected and fault
simulated using commercial tools in order to obtain the
EC of errors induced by SSA (ibSSA EC) and induced
by transitions (ibTran EC). For the transient faults eval-
uation, bit-flips are injected at the inputs of the circuit to
Table 4 Improvement of Error Coverage (EC) of errors induced by
Single Stuck-At faults (ibSSA)
ex5 pdc
N ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%) ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%)
Srp Spp Srp Spp
2 15.5 16.4 5.8 2.3 5.1 122.3
16 47.7 59.3 24.3 5.3 19.6 268.6
128 75.2 79.9 6.3 21.6 42.1 94.7
1024 84.0 91.0 8.4 39.0 61.8 58.5
t481 table3
N ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%) ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%)
Srp Spp Srp Spp
2 12.4 12.5 0.8 2.6 6.1 134.4
16 23.8 28.1 18.0 11.2 28.5 155.5
128 45.2 47.0 4.0 33.0 51.5 56.3
1024 61.7 62.0 0.5 74.5 76.9 3.3
z9sym c880
N ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%) ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%)
Srp Spp Srp Spp
2 4.8 7.7 60.4 22.5 39.5 75.8
16 26.1 31.8 21.9 62.5 76.5 22.3
128 65.6 69.8 6.4 84.2 95.7 13.6
1024 91.7 94.0 2.5 95.1 99.8 5.1
c3540 c5315
N ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%) ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%)
Srp Spp Srp Spp
2 16.1 22.0 36.5 26.3 30.5 16.2
16 45.1 57.7 27.9 67.6 81.9 21.1
128 71.5 86.9 21.6 95.8 97.9 2.1
1024 93.7 97.4 3.95 99.6 99.7 0.1
c6288 c7552
N ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%) ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%)
Srp Spp Srp Spp
2 51.5 58.4 13.5 25.9 29.8 15.0
16 89.3 93.9 5.1 64.2 68.1 6.2
128 95.9 99.8 4.1 84.1 86.4 2.7
1024 98.7 100 1.3 89.8 92.1 2.6
obtain the EC of errors induced by bit-flips (ibBF EC). The
ibBF EC is computed by injecting such random upsets and
finding 50K events in which a bit-flip on an input pattern
Fig. 6 Evaluation Setup
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propagates an error through the whole circuit and reaches
the output of the unprotected circuit (S). The ibBF EC is
the percentage of these upsets that are masked by the redun-
dant circuits (Sp) of the PSFT design and therefore are not
affecting the protected circuit. Furthermore, the EC of errors
induced by temporary erroneous output transitions (ibEOT
EC) is calculated for an application-specific workload of
size r = 20K . The ibEOT EC is the percentage of transi-
tions at the output occurring while executing such workload
that are protected by the selected consecutive pattern pairs
set. The experiments were performed on a Linux x64 desk-
top machine with an Intel Core i7-3770 CPU and 16GB of
available RAM.
4.2 Simulation Results
Table 4 presents a comparison of the ibSSA EC in circuit
S of a random patterns (Srp) set and the ranked proba-
bilistic patterns (Spp) set for a large uncorrelated workload.
As shown in Table 7, SFI execution times are particularly
prohibiting for large workloads, therefore random patterns
were used for comparison as they emulate an arbitrary selec-
tion of workload with no susceptibility information. The
values shown in the Srp column is the average of 30 dif-
ferent random patterns selections. The Spp column shows
the ibSSA EC of the ranked probabilistic patterns. The Impr
(%) column shows the improvement of the Spp over the
Srp calculated as: Impr%=(Spp − Srp)/Srp · 100. Note
that the Spp consistently exhibit a higher ibSSA EC than
the Srp. This improvement saturates as the number of pat-
terns N that is protected increases. This is attributed to the
increased probability that the random patterns Srp contain
highly susceptible patterns.
Figure 7 presents the resulting ibSSA EC and area cost
of the PSFT design for the circuit c880. The results for a
various number of protected patterns (N) are shown for a
selected cone percentage Cp = 0.1. The left axis corre-
sponds to the ibSSA EC and the right axis to the area cost
of the proposed PSFT design. The area cost of the proposed
PSFT design is the sum of the area costs of the three blocks
(S, SP & ZP ) (Fig. 3) divided by the size of the original cir-
cuit: PSFT Area Cost = (2 · SP + ZP )/S. For the scope of
this paper the cost of the voters will be ignored. The average
area cost resulting after synthesizing many Srp sets is sim-
ilar to that of synthesizing the Spp set when protecting the
same number of patterns. It can be considered that power
consumption is proportional to the area cost. Similar to the
results shown in Table 4, the ibSSA EC of the pp is consis-
tently higher than that the one of the rp for all examined N
values.
The computation of the ibSSA EC of the PSFT design
is calculated by adding the coverage in each of the blocks
of the design. The EC in the original circuit S is obtained
by the protected patterns (Spp). The coverage of the SP and
ZP blocks is 100%, as the protected patterns sensitize them
fully. The ibSSA EC of the PSFT design is computed as:
ECPSFT = (2 · |SP | + |ZP |) + (Spp) · |S|)
2 · |SP | + |ZP | + |S| (14)
where |S|, |Sp|, and |ZP | are the sizes of the blocks depicted
in Fig. 3 and Spp is the ibSSA EC of the ranked probabilistic
patterns.
Table 5 shows results obtained for the transition faults
evaluation. The comparison of the ibTRAN EC of the ran-
dom patterns Srp and the ranked probabilistic patterns Spp
is presented. The results are shown in the same format as
Table 4. Note that the Spp also exhibits a higher ibTran
EC than the Srp, despite transition faults not being tar-
geted specifically by the pattern ranking using the output
deviation-based metric.
Fig. 7 Area cost of Benchmark
c880 and the ibSSA EC for
timing-independent errors for a
selected cone percentage
Cp = 0.1
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Table 5 Improvement of Error Coverage (EC) of errors induced by
Transition faults (ibTran)
ex5 pdc
N ibTran EC(%) Impr (%) ibTran EC(%) Impr (%)
Srp Spp Srp Spp
2 5.6 9.0 60.7 0.4 1.2 237.1
16 32.3 38.7 19.8 4.4 11.5 162.4
128 56.7 67.1 18.3 10.4 32.6 213.5
1024 81.3 93.5 15.0 33.9 57.3 69.0
t481 table3
N ibTran EC(%) Impr (%) ibTran EC(%) Impr (%)
Srp Spp Srp Spp
2 0.1 0.4 300.0 0.8 2.5 219.5
16 1.7 5.6 233.9 3.8 13.5 255.3
128 15.2 18.7 23.2 21.3 24.5 15.0
1024 40.8 44.0 7.9 49.2 53.1 7.9
z9sym c880
N ibTran EC(%) Impr (%) ibTran EC(%) Impr (%)
Srp Spp Srp Spp
2 0.8 1.8 125.0 5.4 12.9 138.9
16 7.8 15.9 103.8 47.5 58.1 22.3
128 46.2 56.4 22.1 74.6 91.9 23.2
1024 77.3 89.1 15.3 92.9 99.6 7.2
c3540 c5315
N ibTran EC(%) Impr (%) ibTran EC(%) Impr (%)
Srp Spp Srp Spp
2 4.8 10.2 112.3 7.1 13.2 85.9
16 31.6 35.9 13.6 44.8 52.1 16.3
128 62.4 68.8 10.3 86.8 91.2 5.1
1024 84.6 93.5 10.5 96.2 98.7 2.6
c6288 c7552
N ibTran EC(%) Impr (%) ibTran EC(%) Impr (%)
Srp Spp Srp Spp
2 15.5 30.8 98.9 9.9 15.3 54.7
16 81.5 83.0 1.9 49.3 52.7 6.8
128 97.7 99.2 1.6 79.7 83.3 4.5
1024 99.8 100 0.2 89.1 89.3 0.2
The resulting ibTran EC and area cost of the PSFT design
for the circuit c880 are presented in Fig. 8. Similarly to
Fig. 7, these results were obtained for a selected cone per-
centage Cp = 0.1, thus protecting only the 10% largest
cones in the circuit. In both Figs. 7 and 8, the EC pro-
vided by the Spp is consistently higher than for the Srp,
even though neither stuck-at faults nor transition faults were
targeted when selecting the protected patterns.
Table 6 shows the ibBF EC and the ibOT EC improve-
ment of Spp over Srp, the ibSSA EC, ibTran EC, area
cost and TMR area improvement when only the top 10%
largest logic cones are selected (Cp = 0.1) for 8 and
32 protected patterns. The second column shows the ibBF
EC improvement calculated by the input bit-flip simula-
tion applied on an uncorrelated workload, while the third
column shows the ibEOT EC improvement of the ranked
consecutive pattern pairs of an application-specific work-
load of size r = 20K . The ibSSA and ibTran EC of the
Spp and Srp sets and the improvement of Spp over Srp are
presented in the next columns. Following is the total ibSSA
and ibTran EC of the whole PSFT design, as calculated by
Equation 14. The area cost of SP and ZP blocks (Fig. 3) as
well as the overall area cost of the proposed PSFT design
are presented in the next three columns, respectively. The
improvement in area cost over TMR is presented in the last
column, which is calculated as TMRimpr = 200 - area cosf
of PSFT. Error coverage on the LGSynth’91 benchmarks
is lower than on the ISCAS’85 benchmarks. This is due to
the nature of the circuits, given that the ISCAS’85 circuits
were created as a basis for comparing results of test gen-
eration, while the combinational LGSynth’91 benchmarks
are mainly used in the logic synthesis and optimization
field.
When 32 patterns are protected, Table 6 shows an average
ibBF EC improvement of 89.0% and an average ibOT EC
improvement of 151.8% of Spp over Srp, an average ibSSA
EC of 70.5% with an average improvement of 53.1% and an
average ibTran EC of 56.2% with an average improvement
of 53.5%. This results in an overall average improvement
of 86.9%. We observe an area cost in the range of 18.0-
54.2% for all circuits, which corresponds to a 145.8-182.0%
reduction compared to TMR. Note that for circuit c880
using only 32 susceptible patterns selected with the output
deviations-based metric, provides an ibSSA EC of 88.5%
and an ibTran EC of 78.2% with an area cost of only 20.2%.
The results of circuit c880 exhibit on average a ibBF EC
of 4.47% for Srp and of 7.49% for Spp, an improvement of
67.6%. The logic cones selected with a Cp = 0.1 have an
input space of 210 (10 inputs), therefore, with just 32 out of
210 patterns (32/210 = 3.13%), the proposed technique can
cover 7.49% of bit-flips at the inputs. Circuit ex5 exhibits a
large ibBF EC improvement compared to the other bench-
marks due to the small input space (28), which allows
for a simpler identification of the susceptible patterns in a
workload.
When a specific error coverage constraint is set, the size
of the ranked probabilistic patterns set (Spp) is consistently
smaller than the size of the Srp set. For instance, when an
ibSSA EC of 80% is required, the Spp set is 12% to 63%
smaller than the Srp set. Similarly, for an ibTran EC of 70%,
the Spp is 13% to 61% smaller than the Srp set. Consid-
ering that the same number of random patterns incurs in a
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Fig. 8 Area cost of Benchmark
c880 and ibTran EC for timing-
dependent errors for a selected
cone percentage Cp = 0.1
similar area cost, these smaller Spp sets achieve a 39.7%
average area reduction compared to the required Srp set size
to obtain the same error coverage.
The selective fault tolerance techniques presented in [2]
and [4] rely on an arbitrary selection of its workload to pro-
tect without examining the susceptibility to either faults or
Table 6 Permanent (induced by single stuck-at and transition) and Transient (induced by erroneous output transitions and by bit-flips) EC, area
cost and the improvement over TMR of the proposed technique with Cp = 0.1
Cp = 0.1, N=8 ibBF EC ibEOT EC ibSSA EC (%) ibTran EC (%) Area cost (%) TMR
Benchmark Impr.(%) Impr.(%) Spp Srp Impr.(%) ECPSFT Spp Srp Impr.(%) ECPSFT SP ZP PSFT Impr.(%)
ex5 231.6 133.3 44.5 33.2 34.0 47.6 26.0 21.5 21.2 33.8 5.8 0.9 13.4 186.6
pdc 71.4 162.5 14.2 4.9 189.8 19.5 7.0 1.75 300.0 12.8 1.6 3.4 6.6 193.4
t481 47.2 180.0 21.4 18.1 18.2 28.5 2.9 0.4 663.2 11.7 4.7 0.6 10.1 189.9
table3 45.2 183.3 19.0 7.5 153.3 26.1 7.6 1.92 295.3 15.7 2.9 3.8 9.7 190.3
z9sym 189.7 151.5 19.6 12.4 58.1 25.5 10.7 7.2 48.6 17.2 3.4 1.1 7.9 192.1
c880 55.1 44.7 63.4 59.8 6.0 67.3 41.8 36.9 13.4 48.1 5.5 9.0 14.5 185.5
c3540 222.6 328.6 43.6 39.4 10.5 46.8 24.3 21.4 13.3 31.1 2.9 0.4 6.2 193.8
c5315 201.8 168.4 68.9 50.6 36.2 74.4 37.5 32.9 14.0 48.6 9.9 1.9 21.7 178.3
c6288 243.5 50.0 87.0 83.8 3.8 87.2 68.2 64.2 6.2 71.0 0.8 0.1 1.7 198.3
c7552 143.9 275.0 57.8 55.0 5.05 69.0 41.2 38.5 7.0 46.5 17.1 2.2 36.5 163.5
Average 145.2 167.7 43.9 36.5 51.5 49.2 26.7 22.7 138.0 33.7 5.5 2.3 12.8 187.2
Cp = 0.1, N=32 ibBF EC ibEOT EC ibSSA EC (%) ibTran EC (%) Area cost (%) TMR
Benchmark Impr.(%) Impr.(%) Spp Srp Impr.(%) ECPSFT Spp Srp Impr.(%) ECPSFT SP ZP PSFT Impr.(%)
ex5 266.8 230.8 71.0 60.8 16.8 75.9 53.1 50.6 5.0 61.0 10.1 3.8 24.0 176.0
pdc 75.4 308.7 26.6 6.5 311.1 37.8 19.0 6.3 202.2 31.3 3.7 10.7 18.0 182.0
t481 24.4 158.3 34.2 30.4 12.5 48.1 7.3 5.2 41.5 15.7 12.7 1.7 27.1 172.9
table3 25.1 257.1 37.0 15.4 140.0 48.3 20.2 6.9 191.5 34.6 7.6 8.8 24.0 176.0
z9sym 31.5 165.4 44.8 37.6 19.1 55.3 28.8 17.6 63.6 42.3 10.5 2.4 23.4 176.6
c880 67.6 59.5 86.2 78.0 10.5 88.5 73.8 64.7 14.2 78.2 8.0 4.1 20.2 179.2
c3540 138.1 200.0 67.7 59.4 13.9 74.3 49.5 46.8 5.8 54.1 12.2 1.6 26.0 174.0
c5315 92.3 47.9 90.2 86.7 4.0 93.5 72.8 69.1 5.4 82.1 24.4 3.2 52.0 148.0
c6288 79.7 36.4 97.0 95.9 1.18 97.1 92.2 90.8 1.56 92.9 1.3 0.2 2.7 197.3
c7552 88.7 53.8 78.7 75.9 3.7 86.1 67.3 64.9 3.6 70.2 25.5 3.3 54.2 145.8
Average 89.0 151.8 63.3 54.7 53.1 70.5 48.4 42.3 53.5 56.2 11.6 4.0 27.2 172.8
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Fig. 9 Area cost of different Cp
for benchmark pdc
errors. They protect a subset of all the possible input patterns
of a combinational circuit. These works present results for a
group of small circuits of the LGSynth’91 benchmark suite,
which include the single-cone circuits t481 and Z9sym. In
the case of circuit t481, results in Tables 4, 5 and 6 show
that the proposed PSFT technique (Spp) offers various error
coverage improvements for both timing-independent and
timing-dependent errors compared to an unranked selection
of patterns (Srp). Applying PSFT to circuit Z9sym, Table
4 shows that the Spp set consistently exhibits higher error
coverage than the Srp set. In particular, with N = 128,
which covers 25% of all possible inputs, the proposed tech-
nique offers an error coverage improvement of the Spp
over the Srp of 6.38%. Furthermore, with N = 256,
which covers 50% of the input patterns, the error coverage
improvement results in 5.27%. The resulting area cost of
the PSFT technique for circuit Z9sym with N = 128 and
N = 256 is 99% (TMR impr = 101%) and 139% (TMR
impr = 61%), respectively, which is similar to the area cost
reported in [2, 4]. The area cost of the two techniques is
similar in all cases.
Figure 9 presents the trade-off between area cost of the
PSFT design and different cone percentage Cp values for
the circuit pdc. The area cost ofN = (32, 64, 128, 256) pro-
tected patterns is shown for all Cp values. With a Cp = 1,
all the logic cones are selected whereas with Cp = 0.1, only
the largest 10% of the logic cones in the circuit are chosen.
When Cp = 1, the PSFT design is synthesized for all cones,
which yields a high area cost. This is due to the intrinsic
logic sharing present in most circuits which the synthesis
tool is unable to simply. It can be seen as expected, that the
area cost decreases until reaching a Cp = 0. Note that the
area cost of the PSFT design for Cp = 1 ranges from 176%
for N = 256 to 72% for N = 32, which decreases to 57%
and 18% with Cp = 0.1.
4.3 Computational Effort Comparison
We compare the CPU time that is required by the proposed
technique (pattern-ranking presented in Section 3.4) in order
to compute the most susceptible patterns in an application-
specific workload of 2000 patterns (Section 2.3) with that
required by a statistical fault injection (SFI) simulation. The
SFI simulation consists of five different stuck-at fault injec-
tion campaigns on 50% of all possible fault sites while
executing the same uncorrelated workload. The circuit out-
puts are compared against the error-free case on each cycle
to determine if an error has occurred. The N patterns that
exhibited the highest number of errors across all fault injec-
tion campaigns were deemed as the most susceptible for the
SFI simulation.
Table 7 shows the CPU runtime of both the SFI simu-
lation and the pattern ranking of the proposed PSFT tech-
nique. The second column shows the number of selected
patterns N . The third column presents the CPU runtime
in seconds required by the SFI to run the five different
fault injection campaigns. Note that the execution time is
the same for all N as the simulation must run all the
2000 patterns of the workload to then select the N patterns
that propagate the most errors. Column 4 shows the time
required to find the N most susceptible patterns using the
proposed technique. Finally, column 5 presents the speed
up achieved by the proposed technique compared to the SFI
simulation. The time required by the proposed technique
increases as the number of patterns increase, although even
for 1024 patterns, the proposed technique is several orders
of magnitude faster for selecting the most susceptible pat-
terns in a workload. Additionally, the patterns selected by
the proposed technique are not biased towards any particu-
lar fault model while those selected by the SFI simulation
are biased towards the stuck-at fault model.
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Table 7 CPU runtime of SFI and the proposed PSFT technique
N SFI (s) PSFT (s) x Speed up
ex5 4 16293.5 1.1 14560.2
16 3.3 4915.9
64 12.1 1344.7
256 48.6 335.2
1024 190.6 85.5
pdc 4 78470.0 1.5 51985.0
16 3.8 20902.3
64 12.8 6138.1
256 48.8 1606.8
1024 194.1 404.2
t481 4 16469.2 0.7 24267.9
16 1.6 10028.5
64 5.4 3029.9
256 21.4 771.0
1024 82.4 199.9
table3 4 98964.5 1.1 86972.1
16 3.4 29645.4
64 12.2 8082.2
256 47.7 2072.7
1024 189.4 522.5
z9sym 4 16387 0.9 18207.8
16 1.4 11705.0
64 4.7 3486.6
256 20.1 815.3
1024 78.9 207.7
c880 4 4140.9 0.7 6098.6
16 1.9 2094.0
64 7.1 578.2
256 27.8 149.1
1024 111.3 37.2
c3540 4 36796.5 1.8 20751.4
16 4.8 7626.7
64 17.5 2108.1
256 68.6 536.5
1024 269.7 136.5
c5315 4 105786.7 2.7 39180.3
16 7.6 13919.3
64 30.1 3514.5
256 107.6 983.1
1024 475.3 222.6
c6288 4 134628.3 3.0 45000.4
16 8.6 15575.6
64 31.5 4273.7
256 131.2 1026.0
1024 510.3 263.8
Table 7 (continued)
N SFI (s) PSFT (s) x Speed up
c7552 4 83125.7 3.4 24210.7
16 10.2 8185.8
64 36.6 2270.5
256 147.2 564.8
1024 572.4 145.2
5 Conclusion
We showed that not every workload is equally susceptible
to errors induced by permanent or transient faults, which
results in some input patterns being less protected by the
inherent logic masking of the circuit (Table 1). We pro-
posed to rank this susceptibility to errors in order to protect
those patterns that have the most likelihood of propagating
errors to the output. By combining the technique of Selec-
tive Fault Tolerance (Fig. 1) and a probabilistic fault model
based on the theory of output deviations (Fig. 2), we pro-
posed a low power selective fault tolerance design technique
(Figs. 3 and 4). The proposed technique protects the most
susceptible workload of the most susceptible logic cones
using a partial TMR scheme. We showed that the pro-
posed technique is up to almost 5 orders of magnitude
faster when finding the most susceptible workload than a
fault-injection-based methodology. We evaluated the pro-
posed technique by considering as surrogate error models
the timing-independent errors induced by permanent stuck-
at faults and transient bit-flips and the timing-dependent
errors induced by permanent transition faults and tempo-
rary erroneous output transitions on a set of benchmarks
(Table 3). Trade-offs between achieved tolerance against
permanent (Tables 4 and 5) and transient (Table 6) errors,
together with area cost (Fig. 9) are also presented. We
conclude that the protection of the most susceptible work-
load through a probabilistic fault model that is unbiased
towards any type of fault, ensures that the fault toler-
ance against any type of errors is enriched. Therefore, the
usage of output deviations to determine the most suscep-
tible workload in an application may assist in enhanc-
ing circuit reliability beyond the scope of a partial TMR
scheme.
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